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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT & FREEDOM OF
SPEECH-STUDENTS MAY BE REGARDED AS CLOSED-CIRCUIT RECIPIENTS
OF THE STATE'S ANTI DRUG MESSAGE: THE SUPREME COURT CREATES A
NEW EXCEPTION TO THE TINKER STUDENT SPEECH STANDARD. Morse v.
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
I. INTRODUCTION
On any given day in an American high school it would seem normal to
see a student wearing a tee shirt stating, "Buddha is my homeboy," or to
hear one student say to another, "I love my Aunt Mary." Likewise, most
would not take special notice if a student shouted to a friend in the hallway,
"I can't come over after school because I'm going to mow the grass." If a
student known to have unconventional political views put a button on his
backpack that said, "bring back the KGB," none would question the mes-
sage's meaning. However, according to the President's Office of National
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), these statements all contain slang references
to marijuana.'
In January 2002, Joseph Frederick, a high school senior in Juneau,
Alaska, attended a parade in front of his school and made reference to
another of ONDCP's slang marijuana terms.2 Frederick held up a banner
that said, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" and was suspended from school for ten
days as a result.3 He sued his principal and the Juneau School Board, claim-
ing his First Amendment rights were violated, and the case was ultimately
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.4 The Court held, in Morse v.
Frederick,' that schools may "restrict student speech at a school event, when
that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use."6 The Court
also held that Frederick's constitutional rights were not violated because his
banner could reasonably have been viewed as advocating illegal drug use.7
1. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Street Terms: Drugs and the Drug Trade,
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/streetterms/ByType.asp?intTypeD=l (last visited
Nov. 15, 2007). "Buddha," "Aunt Mary," and "KGB (kind, green bud)" all refer to marijua-
na. "Mow the grass" is a slang reference to smoking marijuana.
2. Bill Mears, 'Bong Hits 4 Jesus' Case Limits Student Rights, CNN.com, June
26, 2007, http.//www.ctn.com/2007/LAW/06/25/free.speech/index.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2007).
3. Mears, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
6. Id. at 2625.
7. Id. at 2629.
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This note will argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Morse signif-
icantly weakens students' free speech rights. The note asserts that the
Court's opinion broadens schools' authority to regulate student speech in
ways that are contrary to fundamental First Amendment values' and expli-
citly allows schools to engage in highly suspect viewpoint discrimination.9
The note will first examine some of the fundamental First Amendment
values at stake in student speech cases.'" Next, the note will discuss the
Court's application of the First and Fourth Amendments to public school
students." The note will then summarize the facts that led to the Supreme
Court's decision in Morse and will outline the Court's reasoning-
examining each of the five opinions. 2 Finally, the note will argue that the
Court erred in its decision in Morse by weakening student speech rights. 3
Classic justifications for free expression apply equally in public schools,
and, as the dissent pointed out, "[t]he First Amendment demands more, in-
deed, much more" than the majority's holding provides. 4
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to Morse v. Frederick,5 the Supreme Court had only decided
three cases directly related to public school students' First Amendment
rights.' 6 However, the topic has received considerable attention from lower
courts and scholars.' 7 This section will first address some of the basic First
Amendment values that factor into the debate over student rights. 8 The sec-
tion will specifically discuss Thomas Emerson's four main values of free
speech and the Supreme Court's prohibition on viewpoint discrimination."
Further, the section will lay out the Supreme Court's treatment of public
school students' rights under the Constitution.20 It will address student
speech rights, paying particular attention to the Tinker trilogy of cases. 2'
Finally, the section will discuss the Fourth Amendment in a public school
8. See infra Part V.A.
9. See infra Part V.B.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part Ill.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
16. See infra Part II.B.1.
17. See infra Part II.B.2.
18. See infra Parts II.A.1-2.
19. See infra Parts II.A.1-2.
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra Parts II.B.1-2.
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context because the Morse Court analogized from Fourth Amendment case
law in holding that Frederick's First Amendment rights were not violated. 2
2
A. First Amendment Values
The First Amendment23 is one of the most fundamental and well known
protections provided by the Bill of Rights.24 Many legal commentators and
philosophers have written extensively about the underlying value of the
right to free expression in society.25 This section will first briefly lay out a
leading theory in support of free expression-Thomas Emerson's four fun-
damental values of the First Amendment. 26 Next, the section will demon-
strate that viewpoint discrimination has historically been viewed as the most
serious kind of First Amendment violation.27
1. Emerson's Four Values of Free Speech
While many scholars have written extensively about the theories under-
lying the First Amendment, Thomas Emerson has been one of the most con-
sistently influential. 2' This section will lay out his theory of the four funda-
mental values of the First Amendment. Many scholars and courts have re-
lied upon these basic values in justifying the importance of free expression
in our society.29
First, Emerson argues that the First Amendment leads to individual
self-fulfillment.3" He observes that human beings are different from other
animals because we are endowed with the ability to reason and to compre-
22. See infra Part II.B.3.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.").
24. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech at the Common-Law Constitution,
ETERNALLY VIGILANT 33 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffry R. Stone eds., 2002) ("The First
Amendment to the United States Constitution is the most celebrated text in all of American
law.").
25. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A COLLECTION OF BEST WRITINGS 135-214 (Kent Middleton &
Roy M. Mersky eds., 1981); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591 (1982).
26. See infra Part II.A. 1.
27. See infra Part II.A.2.
28. See, e.g., Middleton & Mersky, supra note 25, at 133 ("One of the most
productive and systematic First Amendment scholars is Thomas I. Emerson."); RUSSELL L.
WEAVER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 11 (LexisNexis
2006).
29. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969). At the time of this writ-
ing, Emerson's article, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, supra note 25, had
been cited 375 times according to Lexis Shepards Service.
30. Emerson, supra note 25, at 137.
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hend abstract ideas.3' Because of these attributes, Emerson urges that it is
"an affront to the dignity of man" to suppress his freedom of expression.32
Second, Emerson asserts that the First Amendment is a vital tool in
reaching the attainment of truth.33 This value of free expression benefits not
only the individual, but also the broader society.34 The theory is based on the
idea that society is more likely to reach the "most rational judgment" after
"considering all facts and arguments which can be put forth on behalf of or
against any proposition., 35 This theory has also been articulated, most fa-
mously by Justice Holmes, as the "marketplace of ideas."36
Third, Emerson argues that freedom of expression is important because
it allows citizens to participate in decision-making.37 According to Emerson,
a democratic government cannot function effectively if its citizens are not
able to participate in self-governance. 38 This is true, in part, because gov-
ernments "must have some process for feeding back to it information con-
cerning the attitudes, needs and wishes of its citizens., 3' Emerson argues
that the more citizens in a democracy are able to freely express themselves,
the more likely the government will be "brought to the will of its people,
and the harder must it strive to be worthy of their support."4° In this way, a
democratic government "necessarily embraced the principle of open politi-
cal discussion.""'
Finally, Emerson argues that the First Amendment leads to a healthy
balance between stability and change. 42 In Emerson's view, free expression
leads to a "more adaptable, and at the same time more stable community.,
43
This idea has been referred to by some scholars as the "safety-valve func-
tion." 4 Emerson reasoned that when individuals have an opportunity to ex-
press their views publicly, they are less likely to respond violently when the
government or a group of individuals takes a different position.45 Permitting
citizens to express their views "results in a release of energy, a lessening of
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 139.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .....
37. Emerson, supra note 25, at 140.
38. Id. at 141.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 142.
42. Id.
43. Emerson, supra note 25, at 142.
44. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 28, at 11.
45. Emerson, supra note 25, at 143.
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frustration, and a channeling of resistance into courses consistent with law
and order."'46
2. Viewpoint Discrimination Has Historically Been Viewed as Anti-
thetical to the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has long recognized that it is contrary to the First
Amendment for the government to discriminate against speech because its
officials disagree with the viewpoint of the speaker.47 According to the
Court, "[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based
on its substantive content or the message it conveys."4 For example, in Ro-
senberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,49 the Court
held that the University of Virginia violated the First Amendment rights of a
student organization by refusing to fund its newsletter on the grounds that
"it promoted or manifested a particular belief in or about a deity or an ulti-
mate reality."50 This reason for refusing funding violated the prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination, and the Court warned that "when the government
targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a sub-
ject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant."'"
Three years before Rosenberger, in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,52 the
Court struck down a hate crime ordinance.53 According to the Court, the city
could constitutionally prohibit certain actions that one would know or have
reason to know would arouse anger, alarm, or resentment in others; howev-
er, the city could not prohibit only those actions that caused these feelings
"on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. 5 4 The fact that the
ordinance discriminated against certain expression explicitly on the basis of
46. Id.
47. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995) ("The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.");
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) ("The government may not regulate use
[of speech] based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed.").
48. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 96 (1972)).
49. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
50. Id. at 827. Certain student organizations were registered as a
"Contracted Independent Organization" (CIO) and, as such, were authorized to receive fund-
ing for the outside costs of the organization publications. University policy, however, prohi-
bited such reimbursement for CIO if the publication conveyed certain religious messages. Id.
at 824-25.
51. Id. at829.
52. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
53. Id. at381.
54. Id. at 391-92 (emphasis added).
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its viewpoint made the ordinance facially unconstitutional." The Court con-
cluded that the government could not "impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects."56
As these cases illustrate, one fundamental tenet of the First Amend-
ment is that citizens may not be coerced into agreeing with the Govern-
ment's view of any particular issue.57 Viewpoint discrimination undermines
that protection because it "involves the government's choosing one side of
an issue, promoting this position and prohibiting discussion of alternative
points of view."5" According to the Supreme Court, this kind of speech dis-
crimination is adverse to the First Amendment because "[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion. . . ."" Government regulation of speech based
on viewpoint is such a serious constitutional violation that First Amendment
scholar Erwin Chermerinsky asserted in 2000 that the Court had never
upheld such restrictions.'
B. The Constitution and Public School Students
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that public school stu-
dents are "persons under our Constitution,"' it has also held that their rights
"are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other set-
tings."62 The tension between students' Constitutional rights and the "special
characteristics of the school environment"63 has played out most directly in
the context of the First and Fourth Amendments. 64
55. Id.
56. Id. at 391.
57. See also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Majorie
Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 99, 100 (1996).
58. S. Elizabeth Wilbom, Teaching the New Three Rs-Repression, Rights, and
Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 151-52 (1995).
59. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
60. Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 56 (2000).
61. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
62. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (holding that a school
did not violate a student's First Amendment rights by suspending him following a sexually
explicitly speech at a school assembly.).
63. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
64. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. Of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (holding that random drug testing was "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (requir-
ing drug tests for students who participate in extracurricular activities did not violate the
Fourth Amendment); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (holding
school did not violate the First Amendment by censoring the content of a Journalism class's
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This section will first discuss public school students' rights under the
First Amendment.6" Next, the section will address the application of the
Court's student speech case law, pre-Morse.66 The section will conclude
with a brief discussion of the Court's treatment of the Fourth Amendment in
the school context.67
1. Student Speech-The Trilogy of Cases
In 1969, the Supreme Court handed down its landmark student speech
decision, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.
68
The Court expressly held that students and teachers were entitled to First
Amendment protection, but also acknowledged that their interests must be
balanced against the "special characteristics of the school environment. 69
The Tinker Court reasoned that student speech is protected unless it "mate-
rially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others ....
The Tinker test did not resolve all conflicts between student speech and
school authority, however, and the Court revisited the issue in 1986 when it
decided Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.7' In Fraser, the Court held
that the First Amendment did not prevent a school administrator from pu-
nishing a student for giving a "sexually explicit monologue directed towards
an unsuspecting audience of teenage students., 72 Two years later, in Hazel-
wood School District v. Kuhlmeier,73 the Court decided its final case in what
has come to be known as the "Tinker Trilogy."74 In Hazelwood, the Court
held that schools may "exercis[e] editorial control over the style and content
newspaper); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (holding school did not violate student's First Amend-
ment rights when it punished him for giving a lewd and sexually explicit speech at a school
assembly); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (holding students' First Amendment rights were violated
when school prohibited them from wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam war).
65. See infra Part 1I.B. 1.
66. See infra Part I1.B.2.
67. See infra Part II.B.3.
68. 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First
Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 527
(2000) ("Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District is the most important
Supreme Court case in history protecting the constitutional rights of students.").
69. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
70. Id. at 513.
71. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
72. Id. at 685.
73. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
74. See, e.g., Andrew. D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression,
54 BAYLORL. REV. 623, 628 (2002).
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of student speech, in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 75
Prior to the Court's decision in Morse v. Frederick,76 the Tinker Trilogy
provided lower courts and school administrators with a framework for ad-
dressing conflicts between student speech and school authority.77 This sec-
tion addresses each decision in turn78 and the next section turns to the appli-
cation of the Tinker Trilogy.
79
a. Tinker v. Des Moines80
In 1965, in the midst of the Vietnam War, three public school students
in Des Moines, Iowa, decided to wear black armbands to school to protest
the United States' involvement in the conflict.8' The school administrators
learned of the students' plans and instituted a rule prohibiting any student
from wearing an armband.82 John Tinker, Mary Beth Tinker, and Christo-
pher Eckhardt wore the armbands despite the new policy and were sus-
pended from school as a result.83
The three students filed suit in United States district court, claiming
that their First Amendment right to free expression had been violated by the
administrators' actions.84 The district court dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that the school acted reasonably in preventing a "disturbance of
school discipline."85 The students appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which divided evenly on the case.86 The Supreme Court
then granted certiorari.87
After asserting that the students' actions were protected by the First
Amendment as "symbolic act[s],"88 the Court went on to assert that they
deserved "comprehensive protection under the First Amendment." 9 The
Tinker Court began its analysis with a now famous declaration: "It can hard-
75. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
76. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
77. See e.g., Miller, supra note 74, at 628-34; see also infra Part II.B.2.
78. See infra Parts II.B. l.a-c.
79. See infra Part I1B..2.
80. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
81. JOSEPH RuSSoMANNo, SPEAKING OUR MINDS: CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE
BEHIND LANDMARK FIRST AMENDMENT CASES 1 (2002).
82. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 504-05.
85. Id. at 505.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
89. Id. at 506.
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ly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."9
The Court relied, in part, on West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,9 which held that schools could not compel students to salute the
flag in class.92 The Tinker Court adopted the Barnette Court's view that,
although boards of education have "important, delicate, and highly discre-
tionary functions," there are "none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights."93 Given students' rights to be protected by the
Constitution, and the need for administrators "to prescribe and control con-
duct in the schools,"'94 the Tinker Court defined its "problem" as "the area
where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the
rules of the school authorities. 95
On the facts in Tinker, the Court resolved the issue in favor of the stu-
dents.96 It reasoned that there was no indication in the record that the stu-
dents' protest disrupted the school's educational mission or interfered with
the rights of other students. 97 The Court acknowledged the school adminis-
trators' argument that they feared such disruption would occur, however it
determined that they needed more than an "undifferentiated fear."98 The
Court held that student speech could not be restricted at school unless it
would "materially and substantially interfer[e] with the requirements of ap-
propriate discipline in the operation of the school" or "collid[e] with the
rights of others." 99
The Tinker majority was also concerned that the school had not prohi-
bited students from wearing all symbols of expression, and it noted that stu-
dents were permitted to wear other political paraphernalia."° The Court as-
serted that it was violative of the First Amendment to prohibit the "expres-
sion of one particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary
to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discip-
line.",' 0 l
90. Id.
91. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
92. Id. at 644.
93. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637 (1943)).
94. Id. at 507 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 514.
97. Id. at 508.
98. Id.
99. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
100. Id. at 510.
101. Id. at511.
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The Court affirmed that student speech could not be regulated merely
because it expressed a position that was not "officially approved."' 02 In
some of the opinion's strongest language, the majority wrote that "students
may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate."' 03 The Court cited to Justice Brennan's Keyishian
v. Board of Regents""° opinion that the protections of the First Amendment
are especially important in public schools because "[t]he classroom is pecu-
liarly the 'marketplace of ideas."" 05
b. Bethel v. Fraser'
06
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of public school students' First
Amendment rights in 1986 when it decided Bethel v. Fraser.'0 7 In Fraser,
the Court considered whether the school district violated a student's free
speech rights by punishing him for using an "elaborate, graphic, and explicit
sexual metaphor" while addressing a high school assembly.'0 8 The Court
held that the school district's actions were permissible under the First
Amendment.' 09
Although the Fraser Court reaffirmed that students retain constitutional
protections while at school, it focused on public education's role in "incul-
cat[ing] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system.." The Court emphasized that schools are charged with
balancing students' rights to speak freely with "society's countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate beha-
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
105. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishain, 385 U.S. at 603).
106. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 678. Fraser gave his speech at a required student assembly, with 600
students in attendance. Id. The speech was in support of a friend who was running for student
elective office. Id. The text of Fraser's speech was:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his cha-
racter is firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is
firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary,
he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he
drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man who
will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote
for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the best
our high school can be.
Jerry C. Chiang, Note, Plainly Offensive Babel: An Analytical Framework for Regulating
Plainly Offensive Speech in Public Schools, 82 WAsH. L. REV. 403,409 n.49 (2007).
109. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 690.
110. Id.at681.
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vior."" The Court reasoned that socially appropriate behavior required
Fraser to "take into account ... the sensibilities of [his] fellow students."" 2
The Court relied on the school teachers' testimony that many students
seemed "bewildered" by Fraser's comments." 3 The Court concluded that
Fraser's speech was inappropriate for his fellow students and held that the
school did not violate his First Amendment rights by punishing him."
4
c. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier" 15
Two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court heard another student
speech case, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier."6 The Court addressed the issue of
whether a high school principal violated students' First Amendment rights
when he deleted two pages of the school's newspaper." 7 The principal de-
leted the pages from the newspaper because they included two articles that
he believed were not appropriate for all of the paper's readers." 8
In Hazelwood, the Court held that Tinker did not govern the case be-
cause the student newspaper was a nonpublic forum.' The Court reasoned
that the school had not demonstrated a "clear intent to create a public fo-
rum" and that, instead, it "reserved the forum for its intended purpose... as
a supervised learning experience for journalism students."' 20 Accordingly,
the Court held that the school could regulate the newspaper's content "in
any reasonable manner."''
The Court went on to further distinguish the case from Tinker because,
in Tinker, the speech was purely that of the individual students, while in
Hazelwood, there was an element of school speech involved. 22 The Court
held that the Constitution permited schools to exercise greater control over
speech that others "might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school."'' 2 3 The Court went on to hold that schools may "exercis[e] editorial
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 683-84.
114. Id.
115. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 262. The newspaper, the Spectrum, was written and edited by the school's
Journalism II class. Id. The printing of the Spectrum was funded through contributions from
the Board of Education and newspaper sales. Id. The students in the Journalism H class re-
ceived academic credit and were graded on their performance. Id. at 268.
118. Id. at 263-64. One article addressed the issue of teenage pregnancy, and the other
was about the impact of divorce on students. Id. at 263.
119. Id. at 267-70.
120. Id. at 270.
121. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
122. Id. at 269-72.
123. Id. at271.
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control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legiti-
mate pedagogical concerns.' ' 124 In applying its standard, the Court held that
it was reasonable for the principal to determine that the articles removed
from the newspaper were not appropriate for publication in the school-
sponsored newspaper.
25
2. The Tinker Trilogy's Legacy
Following Hazelwood, commentators considered the meaning of the
Tinker Trilogy, taken together, and most have concluded that Tinker was the
high-water mark for student speech rights. 126 Some argued that Fraser and
Hazelwood effectively overruled Tinker, while others maintained that Tinker
survived as the basic framework for analyzing student speech cases and that
Fraser and Hazelwood are exceptions to that basic rule. 27 Many have also
written about the inconsistent way the cases have been applied in the lower
courts. 128 This section will review the post-Hazelwood literature on student
speech, focusing particularly on the question of whether the opinion impli-
citly allowed schools to exercise viewpoint discrimination over school-
sponsored speech.
According to one prominent scholar, "in the three decades since Tinker,
the courts have made it clear that students leave most of their constitutional
rights at the schoolhouse gate."'129 Another scholar asserted post-Hazelwood,
"there is a definite trend of judicial deference to school authorities in con-
trolling school-sponsored expression."'3 ° According to Elizabeth Wilborn,
"the deferential approach set forth in Hazelwood is a virtual abdication of
the judicial obligation to protect the First Amendment rights of students."' 131
Despite this scholarship, others have argued that although Fraser and Ha-
124. Id. at 273.
125. Id. at 276.
126. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 74, at 627; Susannah Barton Tobin, Note, Divining
Hazelwood: The Need for a Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 217 (2004); Janna J. Annest, Only the News That's Fit to Print: The
Effect of Hazelwood on the First Amendment Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement in Public
School-Sponsored Forums, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1227 (2002); Chemerinsky, supra note 68, at
527; Samuel P. Jordan, Note, Viewpoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored Speech: Avenues
for Heightened Protection, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 1555 (2003).
127. Compare, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 68, with Miller, supra note 74.
128. See Chemerinsky, supra note 68, Section IV for a good discussion of lower
court opinions since Tinker; see also e.g., Clay Weisenberger, Constitution or Conformity:
When the Shirt Hits the Fan in Public Schools, 29 J.L. & EDuC. 51, 55-56 (2000).
129. Chemerinksy, supra note 68, at 530 (emphasis added).
130. Martha M. McCarthy, Post-Hazelwood Developments: A Threat to Free
Inquiry in Public Schools, 81 EDUC. L. REP. 685, 689 (1993).
131. Wilborn, supra note 58, at 154.
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zelwood "defined the limits" of Tinker, it survives as the main framework
for student speech cases.' 32 Clay Weisenberger concluded, however, that
"[r]egardless of Tinker's continued viability, the exceptions may prove to
swallow the rule."'
133
There also has been debate about whether the Hazelwood Court impli-
citly created an exception for school-sponsored speech to the requirement of
viewpoint neutrality.' 34 Most agree that the lower courts have applied Ha-
zelwood inconsistently but disagree over whether viewpoint discrimination
should be permitted with respect to school-sponsored speech. 35 Susannah
Tobin argued that schools should not employ viewpoint discrimination, even
for school-sponsored speech. 36 She emphasized that free speech is impor-
tant in schools because students' "sense of the strength of the Bill of Rights
develops in the hallways and classrooms of their schools.' 3 7
Janna Annest, on the other hand, argued that schools should not be re-
quired to be viewpoint-neutral with respect to school-sponsored speech be-
cause it "would paralyze them"'' 38 from "pursuing appropriate pedagogical
goals.' 39 Samuel Jordan took the view that schools should be permitted to
employ viewpoint discrimination over school-sponsored speech, but argued
that schools should be subject to heightened scrutiny by reviewing courts in
such instances. 4 °
3. The Fourth Amendment and Students
The Fourth Amendment generally requires that the state may only con-
duct "reasonable" searches of its citizens."4 In most instances a government
official must have probable cause and a warrant to meet the reasonableness
requirement." 2 However, the Supreme Court has held that government offi-
cials may conduct warrantless searches without probable cause in a variety
of circumstances in which "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractica-
132. See Miller, supra note 74, at 673-74.
133. Weisenberger, supra note 128, at 56.
134. See Tobin, supra note 126, at 219; Jordan, supra note 126, at 1561; Annest,
supra note 126, at 1239.
135. See Tobin, supra note 126, at 263; Jordan, supra note 126, at 1565-79;
Annest, supra note 126, at 1239.
136. Tobin, supra note 126, at 263.
137. Id. at 218.
138. Annest, supra note 126, at 1256.
139. Id. at 1258.
140. Jordan, supra note 126, at 1579.
141. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
142. Id.
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ble."'43 The Court has found special needs in the context of searches by pro-
bation officers,'" government employers,'45 school officials,146 and govern-
ment investigators searching pursuant to a regulatory scheme. 147
With regard to public schools, the Court acknowledged that, although
the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures ex-
ists for public school students, it has a different meaning than for adults in
other contexts. 4 As a result, the Court found that "'special needs' . . exist
in the public school context.' '149 This section will briefly discuss the Court's
two main cases regarding students and the Fourth Amendment.
a. New Jersey v. T.L. 0. 5 °
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,' 5' the Supreme Court first addressed whether
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures applies to school officials.1 52 The Court affirmed that it does and pro-
ceeded to determine under what circumstances a school official may con-
duct a reasonable search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.'53 The
Court began its analysis by noting that "what is reasonable depends on the
context within which a search takes place."'
' 54
The Court stated that Fourth Amendment analysis always requires a
court to weigh "the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and per-
sonal security . .. [with] the government's need for effective methods to
deal with breaches of public order."'' 55 In the context of public schools, the
Court reasoned that students maintain some reasonable expectation of priva-
cy for Fourth Amendment purposes.'56 Student discipline problems and the
school's interest in maintaining a safe learning environment, however, re-
quires an "easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities
are ordinarily subject.', 157 The T.L.O. Court concluded that because of the
special circumstances of public schools, officials are not required to obtain a
143. See, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873; N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985).
144. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
145. O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1980).
146. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42.
147. Camera v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1987).
148. See Vernonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) ("[T]he nature of those
[constitutional] rights is what is appropriate for children in school.").
149. Id. at 653.
150. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 332-37.
153. Id. at 336-37.
154. Id. at 337.
155. Id.
156. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338-39.
157. Id. at 340.
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warrant before searching a student at school and may conduct a search short
of ordinary probable cause, so long as the search is reasonable. 15
8
b. Vernonia v. Acton 59
In Vernonia School District v. Acton,6 ' the Court held that a school
program requiring students participating in extracurricular activities to sub-
mit to random drug tests did not violate the Fourth Amendment.' 61 In so
holding, the Court emphasized the nature of public schools. 162 The Court
explained that schools enjoy a "custodial and tutelary" power over their stu-
dents that "permit[s] a degree of supervision and control that could not be
exercised over free adults.' ' 163 The Court made reference to its First
Amendment student case law in reasoning that "Fourth Amendment rights,
no less than First ... Amendment rights, are different in public schools than
elsewhere."' '
The Acton Court also stressed schools' legitimate concern over student
drug use. 65 The Court was satisfied that the school presented enough evi-
dence of the seriousness of the student drug use problem. 166 The Court fur-
ther emphasized that "[s]chool years are the time when the physical, psycho-
logical, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe.' 67 For these reasons,
the Court held that the random drug testing program did not violate the
Fourth Amendment in the context of public schools. 68
III. THE CASE
In 2002, Joseph Frederick was a high school senior at Juneau-Douglas
High School (JDHS) in Juneau, Alaska. 169 He was punished by the principal,
Deborah Morse, for displaying a banner during the procession of the Olym-
pic Torch Relay in front of JDHS.170 These events led to the Supreme
Court's recent decision on student speech rights in Morse v. Frederick.
71
158. ld. at340-42.
159. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 664-65.
162. Id. at 653-56.
163. Id. at 655.
164. Id. at 656.
165. Acton, 515 U.S. at 661-64.
166. Id. at 662-63.
167. Id. at 661.
168. Id. at 664-65.
169. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
170. Id. at 2622-23.
171. 127 S. Ct. 2618.
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This section will first lay out the events that led to Frederick's suspen-
sion.'72 It will then address the procedural history of the case and how it
came to be argued before the Supreme Court, outlining the lower courts'
holdings and reasoning.'73 Next, the section turns to the Supreme Court's
decision in Morse, outlining each of the Court's five separate opinions.'74
A. Facts
This section will first describe the parade in question and Frederick's
banner.'75 The section will also outline the events following the parade, in-
cluding Principal Morse's suspension of Frederick.'76 The section will con-
clude with a summary of the procedural history of the case addressing, the
Juneau School District's administrative affirmation of Frederick's punish-
ment, the district court decision against Frederick in his civil suit, and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's holding for Frederick.'77
1. The Parade
On January 24, 2002, Juneau, Alaska hosted the Olympic Torch Relay
as the torch made its way to Salt Lake City, Utah for the winter games.'78
The relay was sponsored by Coca-Cola and other private entities and was
open to all members of the community.' The relay proceeded along the
street in front of JDHS, and principal Deborah Morse permitted students and
faculty to leave the school grounds in order to watch the procession.8 0
Joseph Frederick, a JDHS senior at the time, did not arrive at school
during the morning of the relay.' 8 ' When he got to the location of the relay,
the JDHS students had already been released to watch the procession.
8 2
Frederick stood with a group of his friends and waited for the torch to
172. See infra Part III.A.1.
173. See infra Parts III.A.2.
174. See infra Parts III.B.1-5.
175. See infra Part III.A.1.
176. See infra Part HI.A.1.
177. See infra Parts III.A.2.a-c.
178. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 1218, 2622 (2007).
179. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2006).
180. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622. There is some dispute regarding the amount of
supervision the students received during the relay. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1116. Principal
Morse contended that there was ample supervision, but Frederick alleged that there was little
supervision, and that students left the event without objection from JDHS staff. Id.
181. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
182. Id.
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pass.'83 During this time, many students, other than Frederick and his group,
became rowdy and threw plastic soda bottles and snowballs at each other.'84
When the torch passed in front of JDHS, Frederick and his friends held
up a fourteen-foot, paper banner that read, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS." ' 5
When she saw what Frederick and his friends were holding, Principal Morse
crossed the street and asked them to take down the banner. 6 When Frede-
rick refused, Morse ordered him to meet her in her office, where she sus-
pended him from school. 87 Morse indicated that she told Frederick to re-
move the banner because it violated a school policy against encouraging
illegal drug use.' Frederick contended that his punishment was originally
set at five days, but that Morse extended it after he quoted Thomas Jefferson
to her. 9 Morse ultimately suspended Frederick for ten days. 90
2. Procedural History
This section turns to the procedural history of the case. It will describe
the Juneau School District's administrative review of Frederick's suspension
and its reasoning in support of Principal Morse.)' Next, the section will turn
to the District Court's holding in favor of the school district 92 and will con-
clude by outlining the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversal and holding
that Frederick's First Amendment rights were violated by his suspension.93
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. Frederick's brief to the Supreme Court indicated that he displayed the banner "in
the hopes of attracting the attention of the television crews covering the event." Brief of
Respondent at 1, Morse v. Frederick, (S. Ct. Feb. 20, 2007) (No. 06-27).
186. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006). There is some indication
that Morse and Frederick had a history of confrontation over student rights and school rules.
Brief of Respondent, supra note 185, at 1-2. According to one report, "Frederick had been
bothered in his senior year by the lack of attention to the issue of freedom of speech in the
United States, and at his school in particular." Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Rules
Against 'Bong Hits 4 Jesus' Student: Ruling Narrows Student Rights to Free Speech,
ABCNEWS.com, June 25, 2007, http://www.abcnews.go.com/print?id=3306594 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2007).
190. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
191. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
192. See infra Part III.A.2.b.
193. See infra Part III.A.2.c.
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a. Juneau school district administrative review
Frederick appealed his suspension to the Juneau School District Super-
intendent. 9 4 His appeal was unsuccessful, and the Superintendent agreed
with Principal Morse that Frederick's banner violated the school's policy
against encouraging illegal drug use.'95 The Superintendent did not find Fre-
derick's speech to be political in nature and stated that the "common-sense
understanding of the phrase 'bong hits' is .. .a reference to a means of
smoking marijuana. '
The Superintendent found that Morse's actions passed constitutional
muster on application of Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.97 He
concluded that speech was not protected if it "intrudes upon the work of the
schools."' 98 The Superintendent reasoned that Frederick's banner intruded
on the work of the school and, therefore, Morse was allowed to regulate
such speech. 9 9 The Juneau School District Board of Education agreed with
the Superintendent's reasoning and upheld Frederick's suspension.2"
b. District court decision
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Frederick sued the Ju-
neau School Board and Principal Morse on grounds that they violated his
First Amendment rights by suspending him for displaying the "BONG HiTS
4 JESUS" banner."0' The United States District Court for the District of
Alaska granted summary judgment for the school board and Principal
Morse.20 2 The court applied Fraser and held that Frederick's First Amend-
ment rights were not violated.2 3 It believed that Morse was reasonable in
interpreting Frederick's message as encouraging illegal drug use and rea-
soned that she "had the authority, if not the obligation, to stop such speech
at a school-sanctioned activity" because the speech "directly contravened
the Board's policies relating to drug abuse prevention."' '2°
194. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623.
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a-62a).
197. 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that a school could punish a student for sexually expli-
cit speech.).
198. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006).
204. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623.
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c. Ninth Circuit review
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
lower court's decision and held that Frederick's banner was entitled to First
Amendment protection. 25 The appellate court found that Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,0 6 not Fraser, governed the
case. 20 7 In applying Tinker, the Ninth Circuit held that the record did not
support a showing that Frederick's speech risked substantial disruption to its
educational mission because the banner "was displayed outside the class-
room, across the street from the school, during a non-curricular activity that
was only partially supervised by school officials., 208 The Court indicated
further that the record failed to show that Frederick participated in any other
potentially disruptive behavior.20 9 Therefore, it found that the Tinker stan-
dard was not met and held in favor of Frederick.2"'
The School District and Principal Morse appealed the Ninth Circuit's
decision in favor of Frederick. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 2l1 to
decide whether Frederick had a First Amendment right to display his ban-
ner.
212
B. Reasoning
In Morse v. Frederick,213 a closely divided Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit and held that Frederick's First Amendment rights were not
violated by his suspension.214 The majority first concluded that the words
"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" could reasonably be interpreted by Principal Morse
as promoting illegal drug use.2 5 Next, the majority applied the Court's First
and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with regard to students to the issue at
hand.216 In doing so, it held that school officials may constitutionally pro-
205. Id.
206. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that student speech can be constitutionally proscribed
when it materially disrupts the work of the school or impinges on the rights of others).
207. Frederick, 439 F.3d. at 1123.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1117 (stating that the record did not indicate that Frederick was involved in
throwing soda bottles or snow balls with the other students).
210. Id. at 1123.
211. 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006).
212. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
213. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
214. Id. at 2629.
215. Id. at2625-26.
216. Id.
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scribe student speech that can reasonably be viewed as promoting illegal
drug use.2 7
This section will lay out how the majority reached its conclusion.218 It
will also briefly address Justice Thomas's concurring opinion that the doc-
trine of in loco parentis required the reversal of the Tinker student speech
standard.219 The section next discusses Justice Alito's concurrence, in which
Justice Kennedy joined, defining his view of the limits of the majority's
holding.220 The section then briefly outlines Justice Breyer's opinion, con-
curring in part, and dissenting in part.' The section concludes with a dis-
cussion of the dissenting opinion, filed by Justice Stevens, in which Justices
Souter and Ginsberg joined.222 Justice Stevens contended that the majority's
holding weakened student speech rights because it made it permissible for
schools to engage in viewpoint discrimination.
1. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, in which Jus-
tices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined.224 Chief Justice Roberts
first briefly asserted the Court's view that this case was properly reviewed
as a student speech case.225 The opinion points to the fact that Frederick was
at a school-sanctioned event when he unfurled the banner, that the event
occurred during normal school hours, that Frederick was standing with other
students, and that he displayed the banner in the direction of the school. 226
On those facts the majority found that Frederick was at school for the pur-
poses of First Amendment analysis. 27
Upon establishing that the case should be analyzed as a student speech
case, the majority turned to the question of what the words "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS" could reasonably be viewed to mean.228 The opinion acknowledged
that the phrase could mean different things to different people. 29 However,
217. Id. at 2629.
218. See infra Part III.B. 1.
219. See infra Part 11.B.2.
220. See infra Part III.B.3.
221. See infra Part III.B.4.
222. See infra Part III.B.5.
223. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2651 (2007).
224. Id. at 2622.
225. Id. at 2624. Frederick argued that the case should not be analyzed as student speech
case because he was not on school grounds and had not signed in to school on the day in
question. Brief of Respondent, supra note 185, at 33.
226. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2624-25.
229. Id. at 2624 ("The message on Frederick's banner is cryptic. It is no doubt offensive
to some, perhaps amusing to others. To still others, it probably means nothing at all.").
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the majority concluded that it was reasonable for Principal Morse to view
the phrase as promoting illegal drug use because there were at least two
plausible interpretations-the words could mean "take drugs" or the words
could operate as a celebration of illegal drug use.23° According to the majori-
ty, the fact that Frederick did not assert that the phrase contained any politi-
cal message and, in fact, failed to put forward any meaning for the words
other than the banner was "meaningless and funny" supported its position. 3
The opinion next focused on the central question of whether a school
official may constitutionally restrict student speech that is reasonably
viewed as promoting illegal drug use.232 The majority concluded that re-
stricting such student speech does not violate the First Amendment; the ma-
jority applied the Court's First and Fourth Amendment school case law to
reach its conclusion. 3 The opinion began this analysis by setting out the
fundamental rule that "student expression may not be suppressed unless the
school officials reasonably conclude that it will 'materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.' ' 234 It pointed out that the stu-
dents in Tinker were engaged in core political speech and their expression
was a "silent, passive expression of opinion. 235
Next the opinion discussed Fraser, in which the Court held it was con-
stitutionally permissible for a school to restrict student speech that was of-
fensively lewd and obscene and delivered to a school assembly. 236 The opi-
nion acknowledged that the reasoning employed by the Fraser Court was
somewhat ambiguous but determined that the uncertainty was immaterial to
resolving the case at hand.237 Instead, the majority opinion laid out two
Fraser principles relevant to its analysis: first, the "constitutional rights of
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings," and second, "the mode of analysis set forth in Tink-
er is not absolute. 238
The majority then briefly discussed Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,239 the third case in the Tinker trilogy of student speech cases.240
230. Id. at 2625.
231. Id.
232. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.
233. Id. at 2625-28.
234. Id. at 2626 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (1969).
235. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626-27 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 682 (1986).
239. 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that a school was constitutionally permitted to restrict
student-written articles published in a school-financed and directed newspaper).
240. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627.
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The opinion concluded that Hazelwood did not control the Morse case be-
cause the message on Frederick's banner could not reasonably be interpreted
as the school's own speech.24 ' The majority reasoned that Hazelwood was
important to its analysis, however, because it "confirms that the rule of
Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student speech.,
242
The majority also used the Court's Fourth Amendment school cases to
support its conclusion that constitutional rights must be applied differently
to public school students.243 The majority reasoned that its Fourth Amend-
ment school jurisprudence was particularly relevant to its current analysis
because the cases recognized the pressing problem of drug use among the
nation's teenagers.24 According to the majority, the Acton 241 court relaxed
Fourth Amendment standards in public school contexts, in part, because it
recognized the important state interest in preventing drug use among public
school students.2 46 The majority also pointed to the Pottawatomie County v.
Earls247 opinion, decided in 2002, to illustrate that nationwide teenage drug
use has not declined since Acton but has continued to rise. 248 The majority
opinion supported this contention further by referencing a National Institutes
of Health study concluding that the problem of teenage drug use is worsen-
ing in the United States.249
The majority opinion went on to acknowledge that legislative bodies
around the country have recognized this urgent problem and have directed
schools to educate students about the dangers of illegal drug use. 250 The ma-
jority cited congressional action in passing the Safe and Drug-Free Schools
and Communities Act of 1994, which requires schools that receive federal
funds to "convey a clear and consistent message that... the illegal use of
drugs [is] wrong and harmful."25' The opinion also observed that thousands
of school boards, including the Juneau School Board, have implemented
policies aimed at sending students an anti-drug message.
252
241. Id. ("[N]o one would reasonably believe that Frederick's banner bore the school's
imprimatur.").
242. Id.
243. Id. at 2627-28 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Bd. of Ed.
of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)).
244. Id. at 2628.
245. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
246. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628.
247. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
248. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628.
249. Id. (citing MONITORING THE FuTuRE: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE,
1975-2005, SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS, National Institute on Drug Use, National Insti-
tutes of Health (2006)).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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The majority reasoned that the serious government interest in prevent-
ing teenage drug use and the Court's history of limiting students' constitu-
tional rights in the school context combine to make it constitutionally per-
missible for school officials to restrict speech that can reasonably be viewed
as promoting illegal drug use.253 The school board had urged the Court to
interpret Fraser as holding that schools may restrict all student speech
deemed offensive. 254 The majority declined to do so, however, out of con-
cern that such a rule would encompass too much speech, especially political
and religious speech.255
The opinion concluded by asserting that the dissent's position is closer
to the majority's than asserted.256 The majority read the dissent to concede
that there are times when a school can constitutionally proscribe speech that
reasonably advocates illegal drug use.257 The majority closed by suggesting
that the real source of disagreement between it and the dissent lies in wheth-
er Frederick's speech could reasonably be viewed as promoting illegal drug
use, not in whether schools can constitutionally restrict speech that does.25 8
Finally, the majority reiterated its admiration for the difficult and im-
portant job of public school principals.259 It asserted that these educators
often have to act quickly and make on-the-spot decisions regarding discip-
line in order to maintain a controlled environment for the students.2 60 The
majority also expressed its view that Principal Morse's actions were reason-
able because, according to the opinion, if she had failed to punish Frederick,
it would have "sen[t] a powerful message to the students in her charge...
about how serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use."
26
'
The majority concluded that the Constitution does not require school offi-
cials to ignore speech reasonably believed to advocate illegal drug use.262
2. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the
Tinker standard for judging student speech cases is without constitutional
basis and should be overturned.263 Justice Thomas supported his contention
253. Id. at 2629.
254. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 2629.
263. Id. at 2630 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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by laying out the history of public education in the United States.2" He
made the case that, historically, students were afforded very few rights.265
According to Justice Thomas, teachers had virtually complete authority over
their students and could use virtually complete discretion to maintain order
and decorum in the classroom.266
Justice Thomas argued that the traditional doctrine of in loco parentis,
which makes teachers the substitute for parents while students are in school,
should continue to govern public education.267 Justice Thomas concluded
that in loco parentis gives schools much broader authority to regulate speech
than Tinker does and that the Tinker rule should be overturned.26 Justice
Thomas explained that, despite this view, he joined the majority's decision
because it weakened Tinker.269
3. Justice Alito's Concurring Opinion
Justice Alito joined the majority opinion but wrote a separate concur-
rence in which Justice Kennedy joined.27° Justice Alito's concurrence articu-
lated that, given the serious nature of the problem of teenage drug abuse,
schools must have the authority to regulate student speech that promotes
illegal drug use. 27' However, the opinion also made clear that Justices Alito
and Kennedy join the majority "on the understanding that... it provides no
support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as
commenting on any political or social issue ....
Justice Alito emphasized that, although the school environment raises
special circumstances that sometimes justify additional authority to regulate
speech, schools are state actors.273 He explicitly rejected Justice Thomas's
argument and asserted that schools' authority to regulate speech that advo-
cates illegal drug use comes from the special characteristics of the school
setting, not because schools stand in loco parentis.274 Justice Alito asserted
that the school environment is unique because "[s]chool attendance can ex-
pose students to threats to their physical safety that they would not other-
264. 1d.at2630-31.
265. Id. Students were disciplined for "disrespectful or wrong" behavior, such as "idle-
ness, talking, profanity, and slovenliness." Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). "Schools required absolute obedience." Id. at 2631.
266. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at2631.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 2635-36.
269. Id. at 2636.
270. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
271. Id. at2638.
272. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636.
273. Id. at 2637.
274. Id. at 2637-38.
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wise face. 275 It is this special characteristic of public schools, not a theory
of delegated parental authority, that gives schools the constitutional right to
regulate speech that could not otherwise be prohibited.2 76
Justice Alito concluded his concurrence by noting that, while Branden-
burg v. Ohio 77 allows the government generally to regulate speech that in-
cites imminent, lawless action, school officials must have more freedom in
restricting dangerous speech before the danger becomes imminent.2 78 He
reasserted his position that the Court's holding should not reach political
speech, however, and stated that schools' ability to regulate speech that ad-
vocates illegal drug use stands "at the far reaches of what the First Amend-
ment permits.,
279
4. Justice Breyer's Opinion, Concurring in Judgment and Dissenting
in Part
Justice Breyer would have reached only the qualified immunity ques-
tion." According to him, the Court's majority opinion fashioned too broad
a rule on student speech when it was unnecessary to reach the First Amend-
ment question.28' He reasoned that the case could be decided by holding that
Principal Morse was entitled to qualified immunity and, therefore, not sub-
ject to personal liability.282 As a result, Justice Breyer argued that the Court
should "adhere to a basic constitutional obligation by avoiding unnecessary
decision of constitutional questions. 283
Justice Breyer also expressed concern that the majority's opinion
would authorize further viewpoint-based restrictions on student speech.2s
He worried that the majority failed to adequately define the speech that can
be proscribed and would, therefore, leave other kinds of speech open to re-
275. Id. at 2638.
276. Id.
277. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[Tlhe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law viola-
tion except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
278. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
279. Id.
280. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring). Frederick argued that Morse was
not entitled to qualified immunity. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 2640.
283. Id.
284. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2639. Justice Breyer expressed concern over the majority rule's
possible application to speech that might reasonably be viewed as advocating illegal drug use
but was mixed with political messages. Id.
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striction.8 5 Despite these concerns, Justice Breyer declined to join the dis-
senting opinion because he was concerned that it would unduly limit offi-
cials who are charged with reasonably maintaining discipline at school.286
Justice Breyer worried that the dissenting opinion would prevent school
administrators from disciplining student speech that "has gone too far."
2 87
5. Justice Stevens's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, writing for a dissent in which Justice Souter and Jus-
tice Ginsburg joined, reasoned that the message on Frederick's banner was
unclear, and that the school's actions violated his First Amendment rights.
2 18
According to the dissent, it was unreasonable for anyone to view Frederick's
banner as "advocating illegal drug use" because Frederick did not intend to
express such a message to his peers.2 89 According to Frederick, "he just
wanted to get the camera crew's attention.2 2" The dissent argued that, be-
cause Frederick's banner was "nonsense," the school punished him because
it disagreed with Frederick's view.29' This, Justice Stevens wrote, is contrary
to First Amendment principles.292
The dissent then outlined its understanding of the Court's Tinker deci-
sion. 93 Justice Stevens asserted that two foundational principles survive
Tinker-first, viewpoint discrimination in a First Amendment context re-
quires strenuous review, and, second, advocacy can only be restricted as
conduct when it is "likely to provoke the harm the government seeks to
avoid. 2 94 The dissent acknowledged that both principles might need to be
modified in a school setting, but insisted that they remain important tenets of
First Amendment student speech analysis.
295
According to Justice Stevens and his fellow dissenters, the majority
opinion insufficiently addressed both Tinker standards.296 Justice Stevens
reasoned that the majority's opinion will lead to "stark viewpoint discrimi-
285. Id. at 2639. Justice Breyer speculated that speech "encouraging underage consump-
tion of alcohol," or "a conversation during the lunch period where one student suggests that
glaucoma sufferers should smoke marijuana," or "deprecating commentary about an antidrug
film shown in school" might be restricted under the majority's rule. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
289. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2643.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 2644.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2644-45 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969)).
295. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2645.
296. Id.
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,,297nation. Furthermore, he argued, it upholds a punishment against Frede-
rick based on Principal Morse's subjective understanding of his statement.298
Justice Stevens also asserted that promoting illegal drug use does not rise to
the Brandenburg standard of "incitement to imminent, lawless action."299
Although morally disagreeable, the dissent explained, speech that advocates
illegal drug use does not necessarily lead to illegal drug use.3"'
Next, the dissent addressed the majority's concern over the seriousness
of the drug problem in the nation's public schools. 30 ' The dissent agreed that
schools have an important interest in protecting students from the dangers of
illegal drugs. 30 2 Justice Stevens also conceded that in some school circums-
tances it might be necessary to permit narrow viewpoint restrictions or to
relax the rigid imminence requirement of Brandenburg.0 3 In the dissent's
view, however, Frederick's speech was different from the kind of advocacy
that the First Amendment allows the government to restrict.3°4
The dissent also expressed concern that the majority view failed to arti-
culate an adequate test for how a school official or a court should determine
what can reasonably be viewed as advocating illegal drug use.30 5 Justice
Stevens suggested that parts of the majority opinion indicated a reliance on
Principal Morse's subjective belief of the banner's meaning.30 6 According to
the dissent, this was an unconstitutional approach because a third party's
reasonable or unreasonable interpretation of a speaker's meaning cannot
determine whether the speech is proscribable. °7
At other times, Justice Stevens wrote, the majority seemed to suggest
that it believed Frederick's banner could reasonably be interpreted as advo-
cating illegal drug use. 308 The dissent responded to this by asserting that
"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" is nonsense, and its most reasonable interpretation
is not of advocating illegal drug use.30 9 According to Justice Stevens, Frede-
rick did not mean to encourage his peers to use illegal drugs, and the dissent
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 2645.
300. Id. at 2645-46.
301. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2646.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 2646-47.
305. Id. at 2647.
306. Id. at 2647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
307. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2647-48.
308. Id. at 2647.
309. Id. at 2649.
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argued further that the message on the banner was unlikely to actually per-
suade the students who saw it to use such drugs.
310
The dissent concluded by arguing that while illegal drug use among
teenagers is a problem, there is a serious debate in the nation and in Alaska
over the wisdom of the country's current drug policies.3t Justice Stevens
stated that in 1969, when Tinker was decided, many believed that the stu-
dents' protest was treasonous and that the school had a right to prohibit their
speech.312 Justice Stevens also made reference to the prohibitionist move-
ment in the 1920s and 1930s to show that public opinion and policy changed
dramatically with regard to alcohol use.313 The dissent urged that this history
requires the Court to be especially vigilant in reviewing state action that
limits unpopular speech.314 Such speech, according to Stevens, requires the
most protection.31 5
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court erred in Morse v. Frederick because its decision
broadens schools' authority to regulate student speech in ways that are con-
trary to fundamental First Amendment values. First, this section will argue
that the classic justifications for free expression apply in schools as well as
in the broader society.3 16 Next, the section asserts that Morse was wrongly
decided because it explicitly allows schools to engage in highly suspect
viewpoint discrimination.31 7
A. The Benefits of a Free Expression Are Enjoyed Equally in Public
Schools
This section will argue that the Court's decision in Morse undermines
the benefits of free expression, which are equally important in public
schools. First, the section asserts that the freedom of expression is vital in
American public education because students learn about the theory and
practice of a democratic society at school.318 Next, the section applies Emer-
310. Id. ("Admittedly, some high school students are dumb. Most students, however, do
not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacy when
they see it. The notion that the message on this banner would actually persuade either the
average student or even the dumbest one to change his or her behavior is most implausible.").
311. Id. at2650.
312. Id. at2650-51.
313. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at2651.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See infra Part V.A.
317. See infra Part lV.B.
318. See infra Part V.A.1.
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son's four values of free speech to public schools and maintains that these
classic justifications for free expression also apply to students." 9
1. Students Will Learn the Values of a Democratic Society Through
Their School Experience
In Tinker, the Court stated that, while students are afforded more li-
mited free speech rights than adults in other contexts, the foundational rea-
sons for allowing free debate and discussion in society at large apply equal-
ly, if not more, in a school setting.32° In fact, the majority decision quotes
Justice Brennan, who said that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.
The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas. ",321
For society to reap the benefits of open and robust dialogue on issues
of communal importance, young students must learn to engage in such dis-
cussion with passion and respect. It is too much to expect that students will
graduate from public high schools and automatically become participating
actors in a representative democracy if, until that point, their views have
been stifled. According to some educational researchers, "democratic values
are taught to youth by more than formal instruction, particularly where the
formal instruction is inconsistent with the students' observations and expe-
rience. 322 Other researchers suggest that "a more democratic family or
school... predispose[s] children to democratic values. 323
Although it is important that teachers inculcate societal values through
formal curricula, "the way in which school administrators operate schools
may have a more powerful influence on students than the lessons in the civ-
ics textbooks. 324 Mary Beth Tinker expressed this idea eloquently: when
asked whether schools were appropriate places for students to express them-
selves, she said that public schools "hopefully are creating citizens in a de-
mocracy who are familiar with the concepts of democracy and free speech is
one of the major foundations in our democracy. So I can't think of a better
319. See infra Part 1V.A.2.
320. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
321. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (emphasis
added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
322. Betsy Levin, Education Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1654 (1986) (citing R.
WEISSEBERG, POLITICAL LEARNING, POLITICAL CHOICE, AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP (1974)
and R. DAWSON & K. PREWiTT, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION (1969)).
323. Id. at 1654 n.31 (citing R. HESS & J. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL
ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN 93-115 (1967)).
324. Id. at 1649.
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place . . .to learn those kinds of lessons and to have that kind of dis-
course."
325
2. Classic Justifications of Free Expression Apply to Students
Many scholars and the Court have long recognized the benefits of free-
dom of expression in our society.326 Students, as well as adults, enjoy the
benefits of the First Amendment.3 27 This section will apply Thomas Emer-
son's four values of free speech to the school setting.
Emerson argued that the freedom of speech aids in individual self-
fulfillment.328 Expressing ones views and opinions on various issues helps a
person identify what their views and opinions are.329 Adolescence is a uni-
quely important time for self-discovery and development.33 ° It is during
these years when many people begin to consider issues of local and national
importance. Often public schools serve as the place where such discussions
and debates begin to take place.33' It is, therefore, uniquely important to pub-
lic school students' individual self-fulfillment and discovery that they be
given as much room to express their views and debate the issues of the day
as possible.332
Emerson also suggested that freedom of speech leads to the attainment
of truth.333 Although in many core academic subjects the "truth" has already
been attained, this purpose also has application in the context of public
schools. As discussed above, schools are often an important forum for stu-
dents to debate important issues of the day. Broad, open discussion can help
all students arrive at a more complete understanding of particular issues.
Open debate is especially important in situations like those in Tinker and
Morse, in which the Government's official position on an issue will dimi-
nish the likelihood that the curriculum will present all sides of a topic. Stu-
dent speech can aid in raising other issues and perspectives and lead other
students to a fuller understanding of the matter in question.
The final two benefits on Emerson's view are that, in a democracy, free
speech allows the speaker to participate in decision-making, and it also op-
325. RussoMANNo, supra note 81, at 6.
326. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) ("[The] use of such freedom
[of expression] will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity...
."); Emerson, supra note 25.
327. Robert Trager & Joseph A. Russomanno, Free Speech for Public School
Students: A "Basic Educational Mission ", 17 HAMLINE L. REv. 275, 277 (1993).
328. Emerson, supra note 25, at 137-39.
329. Id., supra note 25, at 137.
330. See Levin, supra note 322, at 1654 n.3 1.
331. Id., supra note 322, at 1654.
332. Id., supra note 322, at 1653-54.
333. Emerson, supra note 25, at 139-40.
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erates as a safety-valve, preventing people from resolving their disagree-
ments through other, more violent, means.334 These purposes are intricately
entwined. In the broader context of our democracy, citizens whose voices
are heard and who believe there is a possibility that their expressed views
can change the outcome of public policy are less likely to resort to violent
demonstrations or revolution. Public schools do not operate, nor should
they, as a democracy; however, students are more likely to respect the au-
thority of their teachers and administrators if they feel their views are res-
pected and heard. In this sense, the safety-valve function of free speech has
special meaning in a school context.
B. Viewpoint Discrimination Is Equally Dangerous in a School Context
Morse v. Frederick35 is the first case in which the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly condoned viewpoint discrimination in public schools.336 Further-
more, according to one scholar, it is the first time the Court directly upheld a
viewpoint restriction in any First Amendment speech case.337 Given that the
foundation of the First Amendment historically has been that the govern-
ment may not regulate speech "based on hostility-or favoritism-toward
the underlying message expressed, 338 the decision in Morse is a significant
development in the law of free expression.
The prohibition on viewpoint discrimination is at the heart of the First
Amendment, which is designed to protect against government-controlled
promotion or censorship of certain ideas. By permitting schools to punish
students who make statements that advocate illegal drug use, the Court has
allowed the government, through school administrators, to determine which
statements regarding drug use are permissible and which are not. This is
precisely the kind of viewpoint discrimination the Constitution prohibits.
This section asserts that there are three main reasons the Court should
not have created a viewpoint-based exception to student speech law. First,
unpopular speech, like Frederick's, is most deserving of protection from
viewpoint discrimination. 39 Second, the Court's rule that allows schools to
discriminate against student speech, that can reasonably be interpreted as
334. Id., supra note 25, at 140-44.
335. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
336. See Hans Bader, Campaign Finance and Free Speech: BONG HiTS 4 JESUS: The
First Amendment Takes a Hit, 2006-07 CATO SuP. CT. REv. 133, 142 (2006/2007) ("The
Court for the first time countenanced viewpoint-based restrictions on speech that would clear-
ly be protected from punishment if the speech occurred among citizens in society at large.").
337. See Chemerinksy, supra note 60, at 56 ("Viewpoint restrictions have never been
upheld.").
338. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
339. See infra Part IV.B.I.
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advocating illegal drug use, is vague and unworkable.34° Finally, schools do
not need to repress student speech to advance the important interest of
teaching students about the dangers of illegal drug use, and the Court's
analogy to Fourth Amendment student speech cases is misguided.34" '
1. Minority Speech Most Deserves Protection from Viewpoint Dis-
crimination
The First Amendment exists primarily to protect unpopular speech
from being replaced with the government's position on controversial is-
sues.342 And, although it is hard to imagine that the framers of the First
Amendment contemplated protecting statements like "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS, '  the frivolity of the statement, in some sense, makes its protection
more important. At its core the First Amendment is intended to protect anti-
maj oritarian speech.3"
Regardless of how abhorrent speech that advocates illegal drug use is
to school officials in 2007, student speech that does not materially disrupt
the work of the school must be protected. In Tinker's time, there were those,
including many educators, who believed that students needed to be protected
from the pacifist, anti-war movement and should, instead, be instilled with
patriotism and respect for the United States Armed Forces. The Tinker Court
reminded public schools that, regardless of the majority view, "students may
not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate." '345 This note does not attempt to predict the future
of drug laws in this country, but points out that in many places, including
Alaska, there exists significant debate about whether certain drugs should be
legalized.346
Given the public debate about drug policy, it is especially important
that we do not give public schools the power to set the agenda on a political
issue and then suppress student speech that expresses a different position.
According to Hans Bader, many schools "make it their mission to take sides
in a host of thorny social issues, and it cannot be the case that merely by
injecting themselves into a controversy, they get license to suppress oppos-
340. See infra Part IV.B.2.
341. See infra Part IV.B.3.
342. See Heins, supra note 57, at 100; Wilbom, supra note 58, at 151-52.
343. On Respondent's own admission, it was a meaningless, silly phrase, intended only to
attract media attention for its oddity. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007).
344. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("We cannot lose sight of the fact that,
in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse
of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly implicated.").
345. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
346. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 n.8 (Stevens J., dissenting) ("[T]he legalization of
marijuana is an issue of considerable public concern in Alaska.").
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ing viewpoints., 347 While Frederick's statement was not core political
speech, it implicated a highly controversial political issue. By allowing the
school to regulate it, absent material disruption, the Court has opened the
door to much more serious First Amendment restriction on students.
Furthermore, while public schools may, and should, work hard to keep
students from using illegal drugs, schools can take proactive, constitutional
measures to teach students about the dangers of illegal drug use and can
encourage anti-drug messages. Schools can also restrict the discussion of
drug use to appropriate times and places. However, the responsibility to
discourage drug use should not entitle schools to punish students merely for
making statements that contradict that official, government-sponsored posi-
tion.
2. The Court's Holding Is Unclear and Unworkable.
A rule that bans messages advocating illegal drug use not only violates
important free speech principles forbidding viewpoint discrimination, but it
is also unworkable and inconsistent. The Morse Court did not define a test
for determining when statements advocate illegal drug use. Without a spe-
cific standard for determining when a statement is proscribable, students'
free speech rights become contingent on the discretion of each individual
teacher and administer. This school discretion prevents students from know-
ing in advance whether their speech is protected.348
There was, in fact, significant disagreement as to the meaning of the
words at issue in this case. Frederick asserted that he was not advocating
illegal drug use, but rather was trying to get the attention of the news cam-
eras to be on television.349 Given that the members of the Court could not
determine what the meaning of the banner was, it is dangerous to adopt a
rule that asks teachers and school administrators across the country to decide
when a message "advocate[s] illegal drug use."35
347. Bader, supra note 336, at 150.
348. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19. Cohen's conviction for using "offensive" language was
overturned because "[n]o fair reading of the phrase 'offensive conduct' can be said sufficient-
ly to inform the ordinary person .... Id.
349. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2643.
350. For example, a student's statements during a social studies discussion that the United
States should legalize marijuana may be considered speech that "advocates illegal drug use"
Furthermore, a teacher who shows video of a Presidential debate in which one candidate
discusses his support of such a measure could be reprimanded by school administrators.
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3. The Morse Court Mistakenly Relied on Fourth Amendment Speech
Cases to Create and Exception to Viewpoint Neutrality
The Morse Court analogized its First and Fourth Amendment case law
with respect to students to support an exception to the viewpoint neutrality
requirement in schools."' That analogy is misguided. The Court cited these
cases in support of its assertions that students' constitutional rights must be
applied in the context of the school environment and that deterring drug use
is an important state interest. 352 Neither of these contentions, however, sup-
port the view that student speech regarding drug use should be restricted.
Restricting students' Fourth Amendment rights in the school context directly
implicates schools' interest in preventing drug use because it allows officials
to search for and to seize drugs without a warrant or ordinary probably
cause.35 3 It is improbable, however, that restricting certain student expres-
sion regarding illegal drugs will lead to a reduction of student drug use.354
Furthermore, although the Court has frequently applied the Fourth
Amendment "special needs" test in school and non-school contexts,355 it has
never created a general exception to the requirement of viewpoint neutrali-
ty.356 The requirement that the government refrain from viewpoint discrimi-
nation has consistently been a mainstay of First Amendment jurispru-
dence. 7 On the other hand, the Court has made clear that the "special
needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment applies in many circums-
tances.358
V. CONCLUSION
For many years the Court and scholars have recognized the important
role that freedom of speech serves in our society. Although it is settled law
that all of the First Amendment rights available to adults do not apply to
students in a public school context, restrictions on student speech should be
limited to certain, necessary circumstances. For that reason, prior student
speech cases held that as long as student speech did not materially disrupt
the work of the school, did not impinge on another student's rights, was not
351. See supra Section III.B.1.
352. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628.
353. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 327-30 (1985).
354. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Frederick's
banner, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" would not cause students to use drugs. "The notion that the
message on this banner would actually persuade either the average student or even the dumb-
est one to change his or her behavior is most implausible.").
355. See supra Section II.B.3.
356. See Bader, supra note 336, at 142; Chemerinsky, supra note 60, at 56.
357. See supra Section II.A.2.
358. See, e.g., supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
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lewd or obscene in a sexual way, and could not be interpreted as the
school's own speech, it was protected under the First Amendment.359
In Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court created another exception to
student free speech rights. Although the Court paid lip service to students'
rights by restating that students "do not shed their constitutional rights at the
school house gates," its decision, in effect, weakens Tinker's important
holding that students are entitled to First Amendment protection. In doing
so, the Court explicitly condoned viewpoint discrimination and further un-
dermined individual students' rights to free expression in school. Even in
the special context of public schools, the First Amendment is an important
protection for students who deserve to learn the important democratic value
of free speech by example.
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